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Abstract—The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), 
the block cipher ratified as a standard by National Institute 
of Standards and Technology of the United States (NIST), was 
chosen using a process markedly more open and transparent 
than its predecessor, the aging Data Encryption Standard 
(DES).
Fifteen algorithm were submitted as to NIST in 1998 , 
NIST choose five finalist.
NIST primary selection criteria are security, performance, 
and flexibility. This paper enlightens the last two criteria. In 
this paper we have discussed software performance of five AES 
finalist.
The paper specifically compares performance of the five 
AES finalist on a verity of common software platform: 32-bit 
CPU( both large and smaller microprocessors, smart cards, 
embedded microprocessors)  and high end 64-bits CPUs.
1. INTroDUCTIoN
Security is not only the most important, but also the 
most difficult characteristic to compare. In the absence of 
any theoretical ways of measuring security, we can only 
fall back on estimates and guesses. “I can’t break this 
algorithm, and all those other smart people can’t either” is 
the best we can say. Hence, all discussions about security 
rely on this type of non-rigorous argument. When looking 
at the published cryptanalysis on the AES finalists, it is 
important to keep in mind what the data mean. Historically, 
cryptanalytic results against any algorithm have improved 
over time. Initial results might cryptanalyze a simplified 
variant of the algorithm, or a version of the algorithm with 
fewer rounds. Later results improve on those initial results: 
more rounds or less simplification. Finally, there may be 
a successful attack against the full algorithm. This is why 
the published cryptanalysis against the AES finalists, even 
though none of the results approach practicability and 
none of the attacks are of any use against the full version of 
the algorithms, are so important. By comparing how close 
the published attacks come to breaking the full algorithms, 
we can get some inkling about how the algorithms’ security 
compares. This is not a perfect comparison by any means, 
but it is the best we have to go on.
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The best measure of security that we have come across 
is the safety factor. Eli Biham first compared the AES 
candidates in this manner when he calculated the “minimal 
secure rounds” [Bih99]. Lars Knudsen also used this factor 
when he discussed the AES candidates in his first-round 
comments [Knu99]. Let n be the number of rounds of the 
full cipher, and b be the largest number of rounds that has 
been broken. The safety factor . is defined as . s= n/b. A 
broken cipher has a safety factor of 1. A safety factor of 2 
corresponds to a cipher for which a version with half the 
rounds has been broken. In this context we are very liberal 
in our definition of what it entails to break a cipher. The 
most straightforward type of breaking is to find a key-
recovery attack: an attack that recovers the key faster than 
a brute-force search. However, we also include any other 
non-random property that can be detected faster than an 
exhaustive search of the key space in our definition of 
“breaking” a cipher. This can include a statistical test that 
distinguishes the cipher from a random permutation, detectable 
relationships between encryptions with different keys, or 
more generally any detectable property that an ideal cipher 
would not have. This definition is fairly arbitrary, but it is 
the best we have found given the situation. Excluding certain 
types of attacks as “unfair,” or certain detectable properties 
as “unimportant,” would be even more arbitrary. Including 
unsub- stantiated claims of the form “I think I can break x 
rounds,” or “this property might lead to an attack” make the 
measurement completely arbitrary. It is also reasonable not to 
consider any other type of simplifications, such as modifying 
the rounds themselves. It is trivial to attack Rijndael with a 
linear S-box, or Twofish without the PHT. Taking any attacks 
of that type into consideration would also lead to completely 
arbitrary measurements. The biggest inherent problem in our 
definition of safety factor is that it favours ciphers on which 
little cryptanalysis has been done. Unfortunately, this is 
unavoidable if we want to try to maintain at least some kind 
of objectivity. 
There are two problems in applying this definition to 
the AES finalists. The first one is that most attacks are against 
the 256-bit-key versions of the algorithm. Thus we might 
have a reasonable amount of data on how many rounds we 
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can break of each cipher in 2ˆ256 steps, but there is very little 
information on how many rounds we can break in either 2^128 
or 2^192 steps. We therefore use the largest number of rounds 
broken by any attack on any one of the key sizes. This gives 
a fairly accurate result for 256-bit key sizes, and introduces a 
bias for smaller key sizes. At first glance this seems unfair to 
Rijndael, since we compare the number of rounds attackable 
under 256-bit keys to the number of rounds in the 128-bit-
key cipher. However, this is exactly what we do for all the 
other algorithms. If we had more information on attacks on 
128-bit-key versions we could compute safety factors for each 
of the key sizes, but we simply don’t have that information. 
Rijndael’s reduced number of rounds for smaller keys gives 
it a speed advantage, but it also reduces the safety factor for 
those key sizes. 
The second problem is MARS. Because of its 
heterogeneous structure, there are several ways of defining 
reduced-round versions. It is unfair to only count the 16 core 
rounds, but it is equally unfair to give all 32 rounds the same 
weight. We suggest the following: give the core rounds a 
weight of 1, and the mixing rounds a weight of a. (where a 
is a parameter that we still have to choose). An attack on c 
core rounds and m mixing rounds would thus give a safety 
factor of (16 + 16a)/(c + m.), and all attacks are measured 
using this metric. Finally, we choose a  in such a way as to 
maximize the resulting safety factor. Thus, the weight a is 
chosen to favor the algorithm as much as possible. This is 
not ideal, but it is the only reasonable way we have found of 
getting a number that is somewhat comparable to what we get 
for the other ciphers. 
Table 1.
Safety factors for AES finalists and some increased-round variants.
Rijndael has an attack on 9 rounds [FKS+00a], and 
for the three key sizes has a safety factor of 1.11/1.33/1.56 
(for the three key sizes, respectively). Serpent has a 9-round 
attack [KKS00b], for a safety factor of 3.56. Twofish has 
a 6-round attack [Fer99], for a safety factor of 2.67. The 
results are tabulated in Table 1 and are not very surprising. 
RC6 and Rijndael have the smallest safety factors. MARS 
does better, and Twofish better still. As expected, Serpent has 
the highest safety factor. Keep in mind that a safety factor 
of 1 corresponds to a broken cipher. Thus, even moderate 
advances in cryptanalysis could endanger RC6 and Rijndael. 
In his first-round comments Lars Knudsen recommended that 
AES should have a safety factor of at least 2 [Knu99]. We 
strongly support that notion. The worst thing that could 
happen to AES is a successful attack a decade from now, 
even an “academic attack.” Not only would this create havoc 
in many systems, it could also endanger confidential data 
that was encrypted before the break. Given the very sketchy 
information we have to go on, we simply cannot afford to 
gamble on a relatively small safety factor. In our opinion, 
Twofish and Serpent have good safety factors. MARS is 
close, but RC6 and Rijndael clearly need more rounds. The 
table shows that 34-round RC6 and 18 round Rijndael would 
have a safety factor of 2. To raise the safety factor of Rijndael 
to the same level as that of Twofish would require 24 rounds 
of Rijndael. Of course, an increase in the number of rounds 
results in a corresponding reduction in performance. This 
will have to be taken into account in any comparison with 
increased-round versions.
2.1 MArS
 It is the most difficult task for us to implement 
MARS on smart cards or other limited resources. 
MARS has a complex high level structure such 
as eight rounds of unkeyed forward mixing, eight 
rounds of keyed forward transformation, eight 
rounds of keyed backward transformation, and 
eight rounds of unkeyed backward mixing. Each 
of the eight rounds consists of so called type-3 
Feistel network. In a type-3 Feistel network, 
input data is segregated into four words. One 
of them is taken as a pseudo-random function’s 
input and the output is used to modify three 
other data words. Since MARS has a block 
length of 128 bits, each word has 32 bit length. 
There are three disadvantages of MARS when 
implemented on a smart card. The first is that it 
needs 2KB table for S-boxes, but it is not serious. 
The second is the weakness check of extended 
key on the key schedule. The last is the rotations 
with variable shift amount. W e discuss the last 
two disadvantages here.
 It is necessary for MARS to implement compli-
cated “weak” measures on the key schedule[3].
The weak keys for MARS are different from 
those of DES. In the case of DES, you may 
disregard the problem of weak key because it 
only increases some potential threats caused by 
the weak key properties. However, in the case 
of MARS, since the weak key check procedure 
is a part of the algorithm specification, you have 
to check the weak on the key schedule certainly. 
Otherwise, you may see a terrible result, such as 






34-round RC6  2.00
18-round Rijndael  2.00
24-round Rijndael  2.67
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differences in cipher text, although it encrypts the 
same plain text with common key. As mentioned 
above, the function of checking the weak on 
the key schedule is primarily needed. Although 
implementing weak key check is necessary, it 
is also true that this introduces another problem 
for smart card implementation. If we check the 
weak and regenerate extension keys, there is a 
risk of applying timing attack. The regeneration 
of extension keys causes difference in processing 
time and leaks some information on the key. 




 RC6 has various parameters and is defined as 
RC6-w/r/b where w means the word length, r 
means the number of rounds, and b means the 
length of key with bytes. We wrote the code 
with the recommended parameters for AES as 
RC6-32/20/32. RC6 has a simple structure, but 
the round function includes various operations 
such as, addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
and rotations depending on a variable data. Most 
parts of RC6 are constructed by arithmetical 
operation. Therefore, we operate almost all 
operations on the coprocessor. Furthermore, since 
the coprocessor can operate up to 1,024 bits for 
operand, we can execute the pair of rotations with 
constant shift amount in parallel. An n-bit rotation 
to two data is written as follows: We duplicate 
each of data and put them on corresponding 
CRAM area, then multiply them with 2n. As a 
result, we can improve the performance and 
reduce the size of code. The coprocessor can 
execute RC6 data encryption efficiently. RC6 
has a simple key schedule but needs much 
iterations and it is not suitable with on-thefly. 
The key schedule takes four times as long 
execution time as encryption. There is an idea 
to improve the key schedule processing time. 
A precomputed table improves the speed, but 
also increases the size of code. It omits the 
computation of 43 initial values (S[i]) with 
32-bit word. The modified code copies S[i]s 
from precomputed ROM table to RAM area 
instead of computing S[i]s with constant values. 
It shall reduce about 4,000 clocks. It needs 
some extra code or table for precomputed 
table, thus the size of code increases about 150 
bytes.
 On the smart cards, RC6 has a moderate 
encryption speed among the finalists, but its key 
schedule is slower than Rijindael or Twofish.
Note that it has been reported that on the 32-




 256-bit key is the fastest for on-the-fly key 
generation, since we can translate the internal 
key every two rounds.128-bit key is a little 
slower than 256-bit key, since we need to make 
extension keys every round. In the case of 192-bit 
key, since the key length is not the multiple of the 
block length, it is not so easy to implement on-
the-fly key generation. The xtime is an important 
subroutine for time constancy.It needs modulus 
operation with the primitive polynomial. Here is 
an example of straightforward implementation of 
the xtime(a) algorithm where the original value is 
stored in A register.
 RLA
 JR NC, SKIP
 AND PRI ; PRI means the primitive polynomial.
 SKIP:
 ... ; end.
 This is a very dangerous code. Since ‘AND 
PRI’ operation is operated only when the carry 
is ‘1’, an attacker can know whether the value 
excesses 28 or not in this code. We must avoid 
such an implementation. Therefore, we use some 
techniques to avoid differences of processing 
time and thus prevent cryptanalysis using timing 
attack. Here is an example of xtime(a) operation 
with constant time, where a is stored in A 
register.
 RAM (bytes)  ROM Time
 Total  Int Ext (bytes) (clock)
Encrypt 124 124 0 489 34,736
Schedule 90 90 0 571 138,851
Total 156 156 0 1,060 173.387
 RAM (bytes)  ROM Time
 Total  Int Ext (bytes) (clock)
Encrypt 60 36 24 3,977 45,588
Schedule 512   512 0 1,491 21,742
Total 512  512 24 5,468 67,330
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 RLA
 LD B, A
 SBC A, A
 AND PRI
 XOR B
 RLA is a instruction of 1-bit leftward rotation 
for A register. If RLA is carried out, MSB of A 
register is set to the carry flag. ‘SBC A, A’ is an 
instruction which subtract a value in A register 
and a carry from A register. It means that if the 
carry flag is ‘1’ then A register has a value 0xff, 
otherwise A register has a value 0x00.Next we 
operate AND instruction with PRI for A register. 
Then we get PRI or a value 0x00 in A register, 
and we can operate whether ‘XOR PRI’ or ‘NOP’ 
with the same instructions and processing time. 
The transformation MixColumn is implemented 
in an efficient way shown in section 5.1 in [4]. 
We implement the AddRoundKey and data 
transfers with the coprocessor. 
Table 5. Rijndael
    2.4 Serpent
 There are two kinds of implementation of 
Serpent: ordinary implementation and bitsliced 
implementation. Here is the result of an ordinary 
implementation of Serpent. It is not a bitsliced 
implementation. It needs a 2,048-byte ROM 
table on the ordinary implementation. Serpent 
has various rotational operations. As described in 
MARS implementation, modular multiplication 
with coprocessor can be used if they improve 
the performance. Most of the rotations are, 
however, more efficient with the Z80 operations 
than with the coprocessor.1-bit leftward or 
rightward rotations can be implemented with the 
Z80 operations, and shifts with multiplies of 8-
bit are reorder of bytes. We use the coprocessor 
operations only for 11-bit rotations, XOR, and 
memory transfer. Due to the architecture of 
our coprocessor, it is not suitable to efficiently 
implement three-operand operation used in 
Serpent. In [2], Serpent can be implemented 
using under 80 bytes of RAM with onthe- fly. 
 RAM (bytes)  ROM Time
 Total  Int Ext (bytes) (clock)
Encrypt 34 32 2 700 25,494
Schedule 32   32 0 280 10,318
Total 66 64 2 980 35,812
Our implementation needs twice more RAM, 
because we write it with coprocessor’s operation 
XOR between halves of CRAM with different 
offsets. It has more rounds than other finalists 
do, so its performance is not so good as Rijndael 
or Twofish. The bitsliced implementation will 
reduce the size of code and required RAM with a 
little degradation in speed. 
2.5 Twofish
 In the case that the length of key is less than 256-
bit, we need to pad out the original key until it 
becomes 256-bit.W e implement Twofish with 
128-bit key to take the processing time for padding 
into account. It includes code for padding, and 
it is a little slower than 256-bit key. There are 
two models for implementing Twofish, such as 
Feistel model and non Feistel model[10].W e 
implement it with non Feistel model. We assume 
that it is faster than Feistel. We use coprocessor’s 
operations for additions with subkeys, XOR, and 
memory transfers on CRAM area, but rotations 
are implemented with Z80’s rotations. The 
performance of Twofish depends on the size of 
precomputed tables’ [10]. We consider that the 
case of using some tables amounted to 1,536 
bytes. This code is compact for processing the 
key schedule with precomputed tables.  It seems 
be compatible with 2200 bytes for code and table 
size model in [11].The size of precomputed tables 
is belongs to encryption code in table 7. Twofish 
is as fast as DES on throughput. It does not have 
any exceptional advantages, but we have nothing 
to complain about the performance.
Table 6. Serpent
 Table 7. Twofish
 RAM (bytes)  ROM Time
 Total  Int Ext (bytes) (clock)
Encrypt 34  32 22 493  31,877
Schedule 56 32 24 315 28,51 2
Total 90 64 26 808 60,389
 RAM (bytes)  ROM Time
 Total  Int Ext (bytes) (clock)
Encrypt 68 68 0 3,524  71,924
Schedule 96  96 0 413  147,972
Total 164  164 0 3,937  219,896
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3. CoNClUSIoN
We conclude the performance and the required resources 
on our implementations in tables. We consider that Rijndael 
is excellent on all aspects C6 is as good as Rijndael on the 
code point of view, but the key schedule consumes more time. 
Twofish needs much ROM memory than RC6 and Rijndael 
because of the table. It is faster than Triple DES and equal to 
DES on the throughput.It will have good performance on any 
smart cards. MARS has disadvantages of its code size caused 
by four of eight round iterations and a 2,048-byte table. The 
speed is equal to Twofish’s one. We consider MARS has some 
difficulties to check ‘weak’ on the key schedule and regenerate. 
Serpent has disadvantages of its performance caused by the 
iterations of rounds and the difficulty of key schedule. The 
bitsliced implementation will improve the requirement of 
ROM or RAM, but slower than others. We tried to write all 
program codes to consume as little RAM area as possible. 
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